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INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is a revised version of a working paper which I originally prepared for a seminar in 
May 1992.  Since then there have been numerous developments affecting the liability of 
directors and committee members of non-profit associations, but the basic legal position has not 
changed greatly. 
 
Amendments in SA , Tas and Qld  - only SA relevant on these issues. 
 
A non-profit association, whether it is unincorporated or incorporated as an incorporated 
association or a company limited by guarantee will normally have a board, council, committee 
or some other governing body to manage its affairs.  Until very recently very little attention has 
been given to the powers and duties of the members of this governing body and to their position, 
especially in circumstances when an association becomes insolvent. 
 
At least in respect of non-profit associations incorporated as companies limited by guarantee, 
this attitude changed following the collapse of the National Safety Council (Victorian Division) 
in 1989 and the subsequent successful legal action by the Commonwealth Bank against the 
members of its board under the then s 556 of the Companies Code (Corporations Law s 592, 
which has now been replaced by s 588G) (Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Friedrich and 
Others (1991) 9 ACLC 946; 5 ACSR 115 referred to as the National Safety Council case).  The 
judgment against the Council's former chairman Maxwell Eise showed clearly that the fact that 
a corporation is a company limited by guarantee formed for a non-profit-making purpose with 
part-time directors who act in an honorary capacity makes no difference to the obligations and 
potential liabilities of those directors. 
 
This view was reinforced by clause 101 of the commentary to the Corporate Law Reform Bill 
1992 which stated: `[t]he Court will not be required to consider whether the director was an 
executive or non-executive director, or a paid or honorary director.  While these matters are 
relevant to the director's circumstances they are not relevant to the company's circumstances.'  
 
Until the decision in the National Safety Council case little emphasis had been placed on the 
duties and possible liability of persons appointed as directors of non-profit associations which 
were incorporated as companies limited by guarantee.  When a person was invited to join the 
governing body of such an association probably the last thing he or she would have considered 
was the exact legal status of that association and the implications of its status for his or her 
personal liability.  The name of a non-profit association incorporated as a company limited by 
guarantee will not indicate its corporate status by the suffix `limited' or `ltd' and in many cases 
its governing body will be referred to as the council or the committee rather than the board.  
Until the Corporations Law introduced a requirement for all companies to have an Australian 
Company Number (ACN) there was no obvious indication that such an association was a 
company and the members of its board, whatever they were called, were subject to all the legal 
and statutory obligations imposed on directors.  Although many companies limited by guarantee 
still have a licence to omit limited, a company’s ACN must appear on all public documents 
issued, signed or lodged by the company and is a clear indication of its status (see Corporations 
Law s 219(3)). 
 
Until now, most people invited to join the governing body of a well-known and highly respected 
non-profit association in which they were interested, would have, before accepting the offer, 
perhaps considered whether their expertise and abilities would be of value to the association or 
conversely, whether being on the board or council would benefit them personally in social or 
other intangible ways, assuming that they would be acting in an honorary capacity.  Very few 
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people would have considered the obligations which would be placed on them as members and 
the possible personal liability they might incur if those obligations were breached.  Probably 
even fewer would have sought information about the legal status of the association, its financial 
management, its assets and liabilities and the state of its bank balance, the qualifications and 
expertise of its employees and other relevant matters. 
 
The publicity given to the National Safety Council case greatly increased public awareness of 
the obligations of company directors.  It appears that persons invited to join the governing 
bodies of non-profit associations now carefully consider the obligations involved in accepting 
office as a member of the governing body of a non-profit association.  In the longer term this is 
likely to result in more competent management of the association's affairs as it is now clear that 
it is not enough for a member of the governing body to attend an occasional meeting or social 
event and leave matters of policy and management to the association's executives.  Only those 
people who are willing to accept the obligations involved and carry out their duties honestly and 
with reasonable care, skill and diligence will accept an invitation to join the board or council of 
a non-profit association.  An unfortunate side-effect may be that greater emphasis on the 
obligations of the members may deter not only those who would have previously accepted 
office for the wrong reasons such as personal or social benefits but also others who have skills 
and experience which would be of value to the association.  If voluntary associations which play 
an important role in the community were unable to convince suitable persons to accept office 
and so were unable to function properly this would have far-reaching effects on many aspects of 
community life, especially in the welfare sector.  In the National Safety Council case Tadgell J 
adverted to this danger and a means of alleviating it when he said: 
 
`I should think it right that the courts should use the jurisdiction conferred by s 535 
[Corporations Law s 1318] in an appropriate case to provide a flexible form of relief to 
voluntary non-executive directors of companies not for profit.  It is in the public interest 
that, while directors should be held accountable for their conduct, able people should not 
be deterred from offering their voluntary services for want of adequate protection'(ACLC 
1012). 
 
I’ll come back to this point later - in the light of recent cases  s 1318 which is the general 
relief provision and s 1317JA which applies in respect of civil penalty orders are likely to 
become increasingly important.  It seems to me that there is a very real danger that the 
increased responsibilities now placed on company directors and persons in a similar 
position would deter many people from offering their services.  In many circumstances 
they may feel that there is too great a risk of incurring personal liability and no way of 
avoiding or minimising this risk. 
 
This decision has been followed by a series of important cases in which Australian judges have 
made it absolutely clear that all company directors will now be required to comply with higher 
standards.  The decision of Rogers CJ Comm D at first instance and that of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal on appeal in the AWA case (AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 10 ACLC 933; 
Daniels v AWA Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 614 (CA)) removed any lingering doubts on this point.  In 
at least some of these recent cases  especially Rogers CJ’s judgment in AWA  the courts have 
also set out realistic and useful guidelines for directors to follow to ensure that when exercising 
their powers and carrying out their duties they are not breaching their legal or statutory 
obligations.  It is important not to overreact to these decisions.  However, it is equally important 
for members of the governing bodies of non-profit associations to be aware of the fact that they 
have an obligation to ensure that the operations of the association are managed properly and that 
they may be personally liable for breaches of this obligation.  It is indisputable that the 
operations of many non-profit groups have often been run in a manner which breached generally 
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acceptable business practices (see McGregor-Lowndes, 1991, p.279) without many of those 
involved being aware that they were subject to the same general law and statutory obligations as 
applied to the directors of large commercial companies.  Whether or not they were paid for their 
services was irrelevant. 
 
Recent discussion of these issues in the media has emphasised the obligations and liabilities of 
company directors.  These are directly relevant only for those non-profit associations which are 
incorporated as companies limited by guarantee.  However, many voluntary non-profit 
associations remain unincorporated associations and an increasing number are incorporated 
under State or Territory Associations Incorporation Acts.  It is equally important to consider the 
obligations imposed by the general law or by statute on the members of the committee or 
governing body of unincorporated and incorporated associations. 
 
THE STRUCTURE OF NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATIONS 
 
Non-profit associations are formed for purposes which do not involve making a pecuniary profit 
which is to be passed on to the members of the association.  As with business associations such 
as partnerships and companies, non-profit associations may be unincorporated or incorporated 
by registration as a corporation either under the Corporations Law as a company limited by 
guarantee or as an incorporated association under the appropriate Associations Incorporation 
Act. 
 
Associations Incorporation Acts have been in force in South Australia and Western Australia 
since the middle of the nineteenth century and similar legislation was introduced in Tasmania, 
the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory in the 1960s.  However, these 
statutes only came into operation in Queensland, Victoria and New South Wales during the 
1980s.  In the absence of an Associations Incorporation Act, the only practicable method of 
incorporation for most non-profit associations was as a company limited by guarantee.  
Although many non-profit associations are registered as companies limited by guarantee, the 
companies legislation is inherently unsuitable for non-profit associations because it is designed 
for associations formed and carried on with a view to making a profit for their members.  The 
increasing complexity of the companies legislation has also made it difficult and expensive for 
non-profit associations to comply with its requirements.  Since the Associations Incorporation 
Acts came into force very few non-profit associations which are eligible for incorporation as an 
association have been incorporated as companies limited by guarantee in comparison with the 
numbers that have made use of the Associations Incorporation Acts.   
 
In two situations it may still be preferable for a non-profit association to apply for registration as 
a company limited by guarantee: 
 
 (i) In the Northern Territory, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia the 
Associations Incorporation Acts limit eligibility for incorporation to those associations formed 
for the non-profit purposes listed in the statute.  In respect of associations formed for other 
non-profit purposes there is an administrative discretion to grant or refuse permission to 
incorporate (see R v Medcalf; Ex parte Conacher [1978] WAR 53 and Ramona Konrad (trading 
as Let’s Trade) v State Business and Corporate Affairs Office (SA) (1993) 173 LSJS 100).  The 
only way in which an association which was refused permission to incorporate under the 
Associations Incorporation Act could incorporate would be by registration as a company limited 
by guarantee. 
 
 (ii) Because the Associations Incorporation Acts are State statutes and there is no 
national system of recognition for incorporated associations, it may be preferable for an 
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association which operates in more than one jurisdiction to be incorporated as a company 
limited by guarantee.  An incorporated association which carries on business in more than one 
jurisdiction will be in breach of the Corporations Law unless it is registered as a Registrable 
Australian Body under Part 4.1 of the Corporations Law.  It is clear from s 18 of the 
Corporations Law that the definition of carrying on business includes carrying on business 
‘otherwise than for the profit of the members or corporators of the body.’  However, especially 
in the context of a non-profit association it may be very difficult to decide whether or not a 
particular association’s activities amount to carrying on business in a jurisdiction and the 
statutory definition in s 21 is very little help (see Ford, Austin & Ramsay 5.068).  If an 
association intends to operate nationally and is eligible for the grant of a licence to omit limited 
from its name (see Australian Securities Commission (ASC) Policy Statement (PS) 50) it may 
be wiser for it to incorporate under the Corporations Law. 
 
The terms of s 21 which deals with carrying on business are not particularly helpful in 
borderline cases, especially for non-profit organisations as s 21 (1) states that a body 
corporate that has a place of business in a jurisdiction carries on business there and s 21(2) 
refers to share trading and administering, managing or dealing with property - the latter 
is probably the most important in our context.  Section 21(3) then lists a number of 
activities which do not, on their own, amount to carrying on business in a jurisdiction.  
The list includes, being a party to legal proceedings, holding meetings, maintaining a bank 
account, entering into contracts, collecting debts, conducting  ‘isolated transactions’ or 
investing funds or holding property.  Ford, Austin & Ramsay cite a few borderline cases 
which have come before the courts, none of which really help very much. 
 
There is another potential problem for non-profit organisations which seek to incorporate 
as companieslimited by guarantee and hope to obtain a licence under s 383 which was 
foreshadowed in the Exposure Draft of the Second Corporate Law Simplification Bill.  As 
part of the changes to the provisions regulating Company Names the Bill proposes an 
additional requirement for a licence under s 383 which would restrict its availability to 
companies which are formed for charitable purposes (cll 149, 150 of the Bill).  Existing 
companies which already have a licence under s 383 will not be affected by this change - at 
least not at this stage.  The Bill also proposes in cl 158 that the ASC should be given power 
to change the name of a company to include limited if the company ceases to be eligible for 
a licence under s 383.  This is additional to other proposed changes which would give the 
ASC broader powers to direct a company to change its name. 
 
It is interesting to speculate how these proposals would fit with the draft recommendations 
of the Industry Commission that Community Service Welfare Organisations with a total 
income over a certain threshold should be incorporated under the Corporations Law - not 
all of these come within the present legal definition of charity. 
 
With these possible exceptions, the Associations Incorporation legislation provides a far more 
suitable regime than the Corporations Law for the whole spectrum of non-profit associations 
ranging from those purposes for which non-profit associations were traditionally formed such as 
social or sporting clubs and societies of various kinds to community and self-help groups.  
Although the extent to which the legislation has been used varies it is increasingly obvious that 
more and more non-profit associations are making use of it to avoid the traditional difficulties 
which may arise if an association is unincorporated. 
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THE RELEVANCE OF THE LEGAL STATUS OF A NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATION 
 
Many members of non-profit associations and even some who may be members of an 
association's committee or governing body may not be aware of the legal status of that 
association and its possible implications for their personal legal or equitable obligations to the 
association itself, the other members and third parties. 
 
(a) Unincorporated associations 
 
An unincorporated non-profit association is not a separate legal entity and in the eyes of the law 
it is nothing more than the aggregate of its members at any one time even though it may have 
existed for many years and may have many members and considerable real and personal 
property.  The members may think of it as a separate entity but for legal purposes the association 
does not exist.  The members of an unincorporated association are bound together by a 
consensual relationship which is expressed in the association's rules, although there is some 
doubt as to whether this relationship will always be regarded by a court as one which is legally 
enforceable (see Cameron v Hogan (1934) 51 CLR 358 and compare McKinnon v Grogan 
[1974] 1 NSWLR 295). 
 
It is possible for the affairs of an unincorporated association to be conducted on a collective 
basis by the general body of members acting together, but this is unusual and in most cases the 
rules of an association will provide for the election or appointment of a committee who will be 
responsible for the management of the association's activities.  Traditionally, the members of an 
unincorporated association have de facto limited liability unless the rules provide otherwise (Re 
St James' Club (1852) 42 ER 920 at 922; Wise v Perpetual Trustee Co Ltd [1903] AC 139 at 
149) but it now appears that although individual members are protected against personal 
liability, the members of the committee or governing body are in a very different position. 
 
Normally the members of the committee of an unincorporated association manage the affairs of 
the association on behalf of the general body of members and on general principles would be 
considered to be acting in a fiduciary capacity and under fiduciary obligations towards the 
members, although there is no direct authority for this proposition  (see Sealy, 1962; Finn, 1977; 
Lehane, 1985).  When goods are purchased or other contracts entered into by one or more of the 
members of the committee or an agent acting under their authority on behalf of the members as 
a whole, the committee, not the general body of members are usually held responsible for 
ensuring that the terms of the contract are complied with.  Recent authority, at least in Australia, 
is very much in favour of what has been called a theory of committee liability (see Fletcher 
1986 pp.113-132) although even the judges in these cases have recognised that it is rather 
difficult to provide an adequate justification for this approach on strict legal principles (see 
Bradley Egg Farm v Clifford [1943] 2 All ER 378; Smith v Yarnold [1969] 2 NSWR 410; 
Peckham v Moore [1975] 1 NSWLR 353; Ward v Etherington [1982] Qd R 561). 
 
However, although these doubts remain about the basis of committee liability, it has been 
generally accepted in Australia in respect of contractual liabilities incurred by the committee on 
behalf of the members as a whole and it appears that it will probably also apply in respect of at 
least some claims in tort (see Smith v Yarnold, above; City of Gosnells v Roberts [1994] ATR 
61-846 and see also Verrall v Hackney London Borough Council [1983] 1 QB 445). 
 
City of Gosnells v Roberts is interesting as it is a decision of the Full Supreme Court of WA and 
illustrates both the fact that judges there clearly accept the idea of committee or office bearers’ 
liability AND its limits.  An unincorporated polocrosse club conducted its activities on land 
owned by the City of Gosnells in WA.  During the off season the club allowed members to agist 
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horses on the land.  The fences were in bad condition and a horse got out one night and and was 
Roberts and his pillion passenger collided with it on an unlit road.  They sued the owner of the 
horse, the council and the office bearers at the time of the accident and the current officebearers 
of the club.  
 
The trial judge found that the propeerty was not properly fenced and all the defendants knew 
that and found all of them liable, including both past and present officebearers although he did 
limit judgment against the current officebearers (but not against thoe at the time of the accident) 
to the assets of the club. He referred in some detail to Smith v Yarnold (which had dealt with the 
collapse of a grandstand at a racecourse and the committee of the unincorporated club were 
held liable) and noted that the law had taken a pragmatic approach to these issues and 
concluded that as a matter of policy the office bearers should be held liable.   
 
All but the current officebearers appealed.  The Full court upheld the judgment against the 
owner of the horse and the council but granted the appeal by the office bearers and set aside the 
judgment against the current officebearers although they were not parties to the appeal.  In 
separate judgments both Pidgeon J and Rowland J accepted the principles of committee liability 
but distinguished Smith v yarnold on the facts.  Here agisting horses during the off season was 
not an activity of the club and the liability for any wrongful act was that of the member who 
owned the horse not the club.  
 
The rules of an association may provide that the members of the committee will be indemnified 
out of the association's assets against any personal liability they incur as a result of their 
position, but in the absence of rules it is not clear whether they would have a right of indemnity 
against the assets (see Fletcher, 1986, pp.124-130).  Unless the rules expressly state otherwise, it 
is clear that there is no right of indemnity against the members personally (Hardoon v Belilios 
[1901] AC 118). 
 
Rowland J made an interesting comment in City of Gosnells that the persons elected as 
officers of a club of this kind, which had no written constitution or rules (in fact Anderson J 
refused to accept that it was an unincorporated association because it had no written rules) 
might be indemnified by the members to the extent that they carried out the functions and 
objects of the collegiate body, but noted that it was unnecessary to resolve that matter.  He 
also agreed with the policy adopted by herron CJ in Smith v Tarnold that committee 
members could in certain circumstances be primarily responsible in tort - but not in the 
circumstances of this case.  
 
The inevitable conclusion is that a person should be very cautious about accepting an invitation to 
join the committee of an unincorporated association unless he or she is completely satisfied that 
the rules of the association provided at least a right of indemnity out of the association's assets 
against personal liability incurred while acting on its behalf.  The members of the committee will 
have additional protection if the rules of an association provide for a call to be made on the 
members if this is necessary to meet unforeseen liabilities such as a successful claim in 
negligence by a third party who, for example, slipped and fell on the stairs or a wet floor on the 
association's premises.  Of course, most associations would have insurance against such a 
contingency but it may be inadequate or the insurance company may refuse to accept liability.  
My personal view is that I would be very reluctant to accept an invitation to join the committee of 
an unincorporated association unless the association in question was very small, had no 
substantial assets and did not have any dealings with the public, even if it appeared to have 
adequate insurance and its rules indemnified the members of the committee against personal 
liability.  I would need a satisfactory explanation of the reasons why the members had chosen to 
remain unincorporated. 
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(b) Companies limited by guarantee 
 
When a non-profit association is incorporated as a company limited by guarantee under what is 
now Corporations Law s 383 the members of its committee become directors of a public 
company.  As directors they stand in a fiduciary relationship towards the company and are also 
subject to all the general law and statutory obligations imposed on directors regardless of the 
fact that 
 
(i) the company is carried on for non-profit purposes, 
 
(ii) they receive no directors' fees or other pecuniary benefits, 
 
(iii) the company has a licence to omit `ltd' or `limited' after its name and 
 
(iv) the company may originally have been granted a licence exempting it from the statutory 
requirements to lodge accounts, annual returns or returns of changes of directors and officers 
(apart from very limited accounting relief, these exemptions are no longer operative; see ASC 
PS 50 cl 34 ). 
 
The Corporations Law does not differentiate between directors of commercial, profit-making 
companies who are paid substantial directors' fees and directors of non-profit companies who 
receive nothing at all, their responsibilities are the same (see the judgment of Tadgell J in the 
National Safety Council case ACLC p.1011 and the passage in clause 101 of the commentary to 
the Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 which is quoted above). 
 
(c) Incorporated associations 
 
The members of the committee of an incorporated association are acting on behalf of the 
association and as such are acting in a fiduciary capacity (see Finn, 1977).  They are in an 
analogous position to the directors of a company and are likely to be subject to similar common 
law and equitable duties although there is little if any authority on this point (see Fletcher, 1986, 
p.298).  Depending on the jurisdiction in which an association is incorporated, the members of 
its committee may also be subject to a number of statutory duties based on those imposed on 
directors by the Corporations Law.  These statutory duties are discussed in more detail below. 
 
THE OBLIGATIONS ON THE DIRECTORS OR MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNING 
BODY OF A NON-PROFIT ASSOCIATION 
 
(a) Fiduciary obligations 
 
It is generally accepted that the categories of fiduciary relationships are not closed (Sealy, 1962; 
Finn, 1977; Lehane, 1985) and although once again there is little direct authority, it would 
appear that the position of the members of the committee of both an unincorporated association 
and an incorporated association is similar to that of the directors of a company and they will also 
be considered to be fiduciaries acting on behalf of the members of an unincorporated association 
or an incorporated association.  As fiduciaries they must act honestly in what they consider to be 
the best interests of the persons to whom the fiduciary obligation is owed (see Finn, 1977 
Chapter 3).  It is important to keep in mind that, although all fiduciaries have the same 
fundamental obligations to act honestly, to avoid any conflict between their fiduciary duty and 
personal interest and to account for any benefit or gain received because of or by use of the 
fiduciary relationship, the nature and extent of this duty will vary according to the circumstances 
(see Sealy, 1962, 1967). 
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(b) Duties of care, skill and diligence 
 
As with fiduciary duties, there is no clear authority whether the members of the committee of 
either an unincorporated or an incorporated association are subject to a similar equitable or 
even common law (see AWA)  duties of care, skill and diligence to those imposed on the 
directors of a company.  However, in Ward v Etherington [1982] Qd R 561 at 565-6 McPherson 
J appeared to support the concept of a similar duty when he found that the members of the 
committee of an unincorporated association were the persons primarily liable in respect of 
contracts made on behalf of the members of an association and made some more general 
comments about the liability of committee members generally.  McPherson J said that the risk of 
personal liability arose when a person accepted office as a member of the committee and could 
not be avoided by not attending committee meetings or not paying attention to the proceedings 
or because the person did not appreciate that he or she might be personally liable.  If adopted 
generally this would appear to require the members of the committee of an unincorporated 
association to comply with a duty of care and diligence of a similar kind to that which is 
imposed on company directors.  These comments are consistent with the approach of the 
recent cases on company directors. 
 
It also appears likely, although once again there is no supporting Australian authority, that the 
members of the committee of an incorporated association would be seen as being in the same 
position as a company director (see Fletcher, 1986, p.289) and subject to the same equitable and 
probably also common law (since AWA) duty of care, skill and diligence. 
 
Since the early case of Charitable Corporation v Sutton (1742) 26 ER 642 it has been argued 
from time to time in England that directors of charitable companies should be treated as being in 
a similar position to trustees and so subject to a higher standard of care, diligence than that 
required of company directors generally (see Warburton, 1987, 1990, 1992-3). This discussion 
has been confined to directors of companies formed for charitable purposes not non-profit 
companies in the broader sense. In the United States there was some early authority in favour 
of imposing this higher standard of care, diligence and skill on directors of non-profit 
corporations and the academic debate on this point continues - especially as between what in 
the US are called mutual benefit corporations - clubs on the one hand and public benefit 
associations which include charities on the other - in some US states these are governed by 
different non-profit corporation statutes.  However, recent cases there have rejected this view 
and have assimilated the position of directors of non-profit corporations to that of directors of 
business corporations (see Stern v Lucy Webb Hayes National Training School for Deaconesses 
and Missionaries 381 F Supp 1003 (DDC 1974); Louisiana World Exposition v Federal 
Insurance Co 864 F 2d 1147 (5th Cir 1989); O’Donnell v Sardegna 646 A 2d 398 (Md 1994)). 
 
The modern duty of care, skill and diligence imposed on company directors is based on the 
judgment of Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407.  In this case 
Romer J said that the duty of care, skill and diligence required a director to exercise reasonable 
care `measured by the care an ordinary man might be expected to take in the circumstances on 
his own behalf' and a degree of skill which `may reasonably be expected from a person of his 
knowledge and experience'(at 428).  Romer J here starts off with a seemingly objective standard 
of care similar to that of the reasonable man which is relied upon in tort and then qualifies this 
by 
 
(i) adopting a subjective standard of skill,  
 
(ii) recognising the intermittent nature of directors' duties and  
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(iii) recognising the need for delegation of some of these duties in all but the smallest 
companies.  The question which has never been answered is what is the standard of care, skill 
and diligence for a reasonable director? (see Sealy, 1990, p.100). 
 
It is well known that until very recently there have been very few decisions in any common law 
jurisdictions in which directors have been held to have breached their duty of care, skill and 
diligence, whether reliance is placed on their equitable duties as fiduciaries or a statutory duty 
such as that in the Corporations Law s 232(4).  An interesting exception which was decided in 
the 18th century and which is of particular relevance in the context of non-profit corporations is 
Charitable Corporation v Sutton (1742) 26 ER 642.  In this case the directors were found guilty 
of breach of trust, fraud and mismanagement of the affairs of a non-profit corporation.  In his 
judgment the Lord Chancellor expressly adverted to the fact that the directors were acting in an 
honorary capacity and said that made no difference to their liability for `gross non-attendance 
and leav[ing] the management entirely to others' (at 644).  I am not aware of any reported case 
in the intervening period between 1742 and the National Safety Council case in 1991 which 
expressly refers to the position of honorary directors. 
 
Recent decisions in a number of common law jurisdictions indicate that a more rigorous 
approach is now being adopted to breaches of this duty whether or not action is based on a 
breach of the general law or a statutory breach.  Non-executive directors who were completely 
passive and took no part at all in the management of the affairs of a company were held liable in 
Francis v United Jersey Bank 432 A 2d 814 (1981); Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing 
[1989] BCLC 498 and Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 2 ACSR 405; 8 ACLC 
827.  In Smith v Van Gorkom 488 A 2d 858 (1985); National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd v Worn 
(1990) 5 NZCLC 66, 384; upheld by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Deloitte Haskins & 
Sells v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd (1991) 5 NZCLC 67,418 and the National Safety 
Council case non-executive directors who had taken at least some part in the management of the 
company's affairs were held to have breached their duty of care, skill and diligence.  This trend 
towards higher standards was supported by the recommendations in the Cooney Report which in 
turn were followed by the changes to the statutory duty of care proposed in the Exposure Draft 
of the Corporate Law Reform Bill 1992 which, if enacted, would have imposed much more 
rigid, objective standards on non-executive directors. 
 
The amendments which were actually made to the statutory duty of care and diligence in s 
232(4) by the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 were much less drastic and were clearly 
influenced by the judgment at first instance of Rogers CJ Comm D AWA Ltd v Daniels (1992) 
10 ACLC 933.  In this case Rogers CJ showed clearly that the existing principles laid down by 
Romer J in Re City Equitable could provide a practical and commercially realistic standard for 
non-executive directors of modern companies.  This was the first case since City Equitable in 
which a judge had carefully considered the function of executive and non-executive directors in 
corporate management and the many differences between them. 
 
His judgment received wide support from the business community and the legal profession and 
was quickly followed in a number of Western Australian prosecutions against non-executive 
directors for breach of their statutory duty of care  with varying results but the tenor of these 
cases seemed to indicate that directors who had acted in good faith, had actively 
participated in the company’s affairs as far as they were able or (in some cases) allowed to 
 and had done their best to monitor what was going on and to ensure that it was properly 
run would not be held to have breached their duties..  However, in May 1995 the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal handed down their decision in the appeal in AWA in which the majority 
rejected the approach adopted by Rogers CJ and imposed much stricter standards on non-
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executive directors.  Although, on the facts the Court of Appeal found that the non-executive 
directors of AWA had not breached either their equitable duty as fiduciaries or their common law 
duty of care, the majority judgment applied a much stricter standard placed much greater 
emphasis on the responsibility of non-executive directors to monitor the company’s operations 
(Daniels v AWA Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 614).  This decision was handed down in May 1995 and it 
is too early to have any real idea of how it will be applied by lower courts. 
 
One important point on which the Court of Appeal agreed with Rogers CJ was that directors 
could be sued for damages for negligence at common law.  Previously actions against directors 
had been for breach of the equitable duty of care, skill and diligence which, as fiduciaries, they 
owed to the company.  In AWA both Rogers CJ and the Court of Appeal found that directors had 
a duty at common law as well as in equity and as Rogers CJ commented the common law duty 
‘though sounding in common law damages, will not call for any different duty from that which 
the law already requires.  The legal label may change but the contents of the bottle will remain 
the same’ (10 ACLC at 1019).  The Court of Appeal agreed, noting that arguments against 
directors having a common law duty to the company were outdated (13 ACLC at 656).  This may 
have serious implications for all directors and persons in a similar position I’ll come back to this 
point in a moment. 
 
At first instance Rogers CJ had said the proper performance of a non-executive director’s duties 
necessarily depended on that persons knowledge and experience, the size and kind of business 
involved and the way in which the company operated (10 ACLC 1,012).  The board was 
responsible for making major policy decisions, not for actually implementing those decisions or 
for the day to day management of the company.  That was the responsibility of senior executives 
(including executive directors) and management.  In normal circumstances the non-executive 
directors were entitled to rely on management to manage the corporation and to trust them to do 
so competently and in accordance with the policies laid down by the board.   
 
This matter of reliance on management was one of the most important differences between the 
judgment of Rogers CJ and that of the Court of Appeal.  The judgment of the Court of Appeal 
made it quite clear that in their view all directors, both executive and non-executive, would now 
have to comply with stricter standards of care, skill and diligence.  All directors had a 
responsibility to ‘take reasonable steps to place themselves in a position to guide and monitor the 
company’ (13 ACLC at 662).  Non-executive directors could not just rely on the company’s 
executives and officers, they had to become familiar with the company’s business and ensure that 
they were properly informed about its activities.  If a person accepts the office of a director that 
person has a responsibility to ensure that ‘he or she understands the nature of the duty a director 
is called upon to perform’ (Ibid at 665).  While the Court of Appeal accepted that a director’s 
duties will vary according to the size and business of the particular company, all directors have 
both an equitable and a common law duty to act with reasonable care, skill and diligence which 
includes the duty ‘of acting collectively to manage the company’ (ibid at 666).  The judgment of 
the Court of Appeal does not provide very much assistance to help directors discover the 
standards of care, skill and diligence with which they will be expected to comply, but it does 
make it absolutely clear that ‘[t]he concept of a sleeping or passive director has not survived’ 
(Ibid at 665). 
 
Acknowledge that these comments owe much to the papers and discussion at a seminar on 
this case conducted recently by the Corporate Law Interest Group at University of 
Melbourne at which Rogers CJ was a speaker together with Professor Bob Baxt. 
 
The problem is that the Court of Appeal’s judgment requires all directors to comply with 
minim objectively measured standards but doesn’t provide guidelines so one is pushed back 
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to the judgment of Rogers CJ which the Court of Appeal expressly disagreed with on this 
point.  It is particularly difficult to work out what would be the position for someone who 
did not have expertise in a particular area, especially when the Court of Appeal quotes 
extensively from US cases as showing what the position is but does not mention that there 
are huge differences between the two legal systems and especially that in the US there is a 
business judgment rule which protects directors if a decision which proves later to have 
been the wrong one has been made in good faith and on a properly informed basis. 
 
The implications of both these judgments should be clear to all directors and committee members 
of non-profit associations.  If persons agree to accept appointment to a board or committee they 
should be aware of their responsibilities to ensure that they are in a position to guide and monitor 
the management of the association.  They cannot ‘safely proceed on the basis that ignorance and 
a failure to inquire are a protection against the law of negligence’ (ibid at 663). 
 
Both Rogers CJ and the Court of Appeal accepted that directors now have both an equitable and a 
common law duty of care and to some extent this will be measured objectively.  This opens up a 
new minefield for directors who could potentially be liable for damages for economic loss 
caused by breached of their duty of care.  This goes a lot further than compensation for 
breaches of the equitable duty of care, skill and diligence. 
 
At the seminar Rogers QC pointed out that no one says now that directors should not have 
a duty to monitor the affairs of a company - the difficulty is to determine how much 
monitoring should be required - particularly by non-executive directors.  He commented 
that non-executive directors are not in as good a position as executive directors to do this as 
the latter in effect control the company and in his view the distinction between them should 
be kept - realistically they can’t be treated in the same way.  He saw this as a real problem 
with the judgment of the Court of Appeal. 
 
Both also accepted that subjective factors, such as the size of the company and the experience or 
skill of a particular director still had to be taken into account.  The balance between these 
objective and subjective elements remains unclear. 
 
(c) Statutory duties of directors and committee members 
 
(i) Applying to the committee and officers of incorporated associations 
 
The Associations Incorporation Acts are not uniform and the approach adopted in the statutes to 
the enforcement of the duties of committee members (and in some cases officers) varies widely.  
The general impression is that those responsible for drafting the more recent statutes tended to 
look only at issues which were topical in a particular jurisdiction at the time the legislation was 
introduced and little attention was directed to broader aspects of the legislation or to creating a 
consistent approach nationally. 
 
The Acts in Tasmania and the Northern Territory which were introduced in the 1960s do not 
impose any general fiduciary obligations or statutory duties on the committee members of an 
incorporated association.  The legislation imposes specific duties in respect of auditing the 
association's accounts, lodging financial statements and ensuring that the association has a public 
officer whose identity and address is recorded with the Registrar.  However, the position is 
different in other Australian jurisdictions, especially South Australia, where the statutes impose 
duties which assimilate the position of the members of the committee at least partially to that of 
company directors.  In Queensland (** Error **once the 1995 amendments are proclaimed), 
South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory persons are deemed to be ineligible to be 
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elected or to remain committee members of incorporated associations for reasons such as 
insanity, insolvency, or conviction of certain offences.  These provisions are clearly modelled on 
those in the Corporations Law. 
 
In Queensland and Victoria the fiduciary duties of the members of the committee of an 
incorporated association are regulated solely by the general law.  In the remaining four 
jurisdictions certain specific statutory duties taken from those in the Corporations Law have been 
included in the Act.  These are summarised below. 
 
The Australian Capital Territory 
Section 65 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1991 requires a committee member to disclose 
any direct or indirect pecuniary interest in a contract with the association to the committee and 
the next general meeting of the association.  That person may participate in the committee's 
deliberations but may not vote in respect of the contract.  Section 111 of the Act makes it an 
offence for an officer of an incorporated association to make improper use of his or her position. 
 
I. New South Wales 
There are no provisions requiring committee members to disclose any conflict of interest.  
However, ss 37-41 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1984 are derived from the former 
fraudulent and insolvent trading provisions of the Companies Code and Corporations Law and 
impose similar obligations on the members of the committee of an incorporated association.  As 
yet these have not been amended to reflect the changes made to this part of the Corporations Law 
by the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 which came into effect in June 1993. 
 
I. South Australia 
Provisions derived from those applying to company directors which regulate eligibility for 
membership of the committee of an incorporated association, require disclosure of conflicts of 
interest and impose basic fiduciary duties were included in the Associations Incorporation Act 
1985.  These were revised and expanded in 1992.  Committee members and officers of 
incorporated associations in South Australia are now in a very similar position to company 
directors.  They have a duty not to deceive or defraud an association, its members or creditors; a 
duty not to make improper use of information acquired as a result of their position or to make 
improper use of their position and a duty to act with reasonable care and diligence (s 39A).  
Exemption or indemnification clauses are prohibited by s 39B. 
 
Section 40A, which was also added in 1992, applied the majority of the winding up provisions in 
the Corporations Law to the winding up of incorporated associations.  This has serious 
implications for the committee members or any other persons within the definition of officer of 
an incorporated association who will now be subject to the obligations placed on directors and 
officers by the Corporations Law in respect of matters such as disclosure of property disposed of 
other than in the ordinary course of business, delivery of an association’s books and property and, 
most important of all, insolvent trading (see Sinclair).  There is an ongoing debate in the pages 
of the SA Law Society Bulletin as to the position of committee members of incorporated 
associations in the light of these amendments, especially in respect of insolvent trading.  
Same issue as I have raised in Companies and Securities Law Journal and I’ll come back to 
it. 
 
I. Western Australia 
Section 22 of the Associations Incorporation Act 1987 requires a committee member to disclose 
any pecuniary interest in a contract with the association, prohibits that person voting on the issue 
and, unlike the other similar provisions, also prohibits that person any participating in the 
committee's deliberations. 
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It should be noted that, with the exception of the South Australian Act, none of the statutes 
requires committee members or officers to comply with a basic fiduciary duty along the lines of s 
232 of the Corporations Law.  For example, in New South Wales, the Act deals with fraudulent 
and insolvent trading, but nothing else. 
 
(ii) The directors and officers of companies limited by guarantee 
 
Subject to any exemptions given under s 383 of the Corporations Law the directors and officers 
(as defined in Corporations Law s 82A) of a company limited by guarantee must comply with the 
same statutory duties as their counterparts in other public companies.  The fact that the directors 
will almost always be acting in a voluntary capacity and will not be paid directors' fees makes no 
difference at all to their position under the Corporations Law.  
 
If we put dishonesty and other possible breaches of fiduciary duty to one side and look only at the 
statutory obligations of a director who is honest and well-meaning and who has accepted an 
invitation to join the board of a non-profit association which is incorporated as a company limited 
by guarantee, what are the main provisions with which that person should be concerned? 
 
I. Corporations Law s 232(4): duty of care and diligence 
As noted above, s 232(4) was amended by the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992.  The section 
now provides: 
 
In the exercise of his or her powers and the discharge of his or her duties, an officer of a 
corporation must exercise the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person in a like 
position in a corporation would exercise in the corporation’s circumstances. 
 
The Explanatory Memorandum noted that the amendments were intended to clarify, not to 
change the existing law.  Until the Corporate Law Reform Act came into force, a breach of s 
232(4) was a criminal offence.  This is now a civil penalty provision so that in the absence of 
dishonesty breaches of s 232(4) are subject to civil not criminal penalties and treated as civil 
proceedings. This means that the standard of proof required is now the civil standard of balance 
of probabilities rather than the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The 
previous maximum fine of $5,000 has been replaced by a maximum pecuniary penalty of 
$200,000 and/or disqualification from managing a corporation (s 1317EA). Only the Australian 
Securities Commission (ASC) or its delegate or a person authorised by it may apply for a civil 
penalty order for breach of the section but the right to bring civil proceedings for compensation is 
preserved by s 232(11) (see Ford, Austin & Ramsay [8.355]-[8.360]). As yet there are no 
decisions to give any guidance on how the new wording of s 232(4) will be interpreted by the 
courts. 
 
In Byrne v Baker [1964] VR 443 the Supreme Court of Victoria held that the standard to be used 
when deciding whether there was a breach of the statutory duty of care and diligence in the 
predecessor to s 232(4) was that formulated by Romer J in Re City Equitable.  A significant 
difference between the general law and statutory duties which still remains is that the statute 
makes no mention of skill, requiring only diligence.  For many years it appeared that with very 
few exceptions, the duty of care and diligence was, in practice, unenforceable in the absence of 
dishonesty, regardless of whether a civil or a criminal action (for breach of equitable duty on 
one had or breach of the section on the other) was brought against a director.   
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It is now clear that this is no longer the position.  Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley, the 
National Safety Council case and other recent cases dealing with insolvent trading left no doubt 
that Australian courts are going to take a much more stringent approach to possible negligence by 
directors, especially when the company becomes insolvent.  Although, until AWA, these cases 
dealt with breaches of the insolvent trading provisions then in force (s 556 of the Companies 
Code and Corporations Law s 592) the judges did not limit their remarks to that context. 
 
The directors of AWA Ltd were alleged to have acted negligently.  They were not charged with 
breaches of s 232(4) or under the insolvent trading provisions.  However, the approach adopted 
by Rogers CJ was equally relevant to breaches of the statutory duty of care and diligence and 
shortly after he handed down his decision at first instance, his judgment was relied on by judges 
in the Western Australian Supreme Court in several cases where non-executive directors were 
charged with breaches of the former s 232(4) (see ASC v Gallagher (1993) 11 ACLC 286; Hurley 
v NCSC (1993) 11 ACLC 443; Vrisakis v ASC (1993) 11 ACLC 763; Biala v Mallina Holdings 
Ltd (1993) 11 ACLC 1082; Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 12 ACLC 674). 
Each of these cases concerned alleged breaches of s 232(4) before it was amended by the 
Corporate Law Reform Act 1992 (some also involved breaches of fiduciary duty) and all were 
decided before the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in the appeal in AWA.  
 
As discussed above, the majority of the Court of Appeal placed greater emphasis than Rogers CJ 
on the need for all directors to be fully informed about the operations of the company and 
adopted a much stricter approach to the question of delegation.  While the implications of the 
differences between these judgments will have to be worked out in future cases, the basic position 
is quite clear. There is no doubt at all that all directors will now be expected to be aware of their 
obligations as a director, to attend meetings regularly, to ensure that they are fully informed as to 
the company's affairs, and to avoid practices such as leaving important decisions on policy and 
financial matters to employees, signing blank cheques (it is instructive here to read the report of 
Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing) and generally treating their office as a pleasant sinecure.  
However, the standard of care and diligence to be applied, the degree of skill required and the 
extent to which directors may rely on management and other experts remain uncertain (see also 
Re Property Force Consultants Pty Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 1, 051 where Derrington J considered 
the general obligations of a director who had been appointed because of his specialist skills and 
expertise). 
 
In this case the director had been appointed because of specialist knowledge of town 
planning and the question was whether he was liable for a breach of s 232(4) - the duty of 
care and diligence - for failing to enquire into the source of a large sum of money which 
appeared in the directors’ personal account and which was the proceeds of a cheque 
payable to the company which had been wrongfully converted by his co-director.  The 
account in question was being used to run the business as the company’s account was 
dormant.  Derrington J held that the fact that he had been appointed as a specialist did not 
remove his general duty to monitor the company’s affairs - long quote from judgment of 
Court of Appeal in AWA.  He couldn’t ignore everything outside his own area of expertise 
but here even on this standard it couldn’t be said he was negligent -  he was justified in 
trusting his co -director and there were no clear warning signs which should have alerted 
him to the fact that something was wrong and so he had not breached his duty.  To reach 
this conclusion Derrington J considered the details of the circumstances very closely - 
boiled down to a realistic approach. 
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I. Insolvent trading: Corporations Law s 592 and s 588G 
These provisions may not only apply to directors of companies incorporated under the 
Corporations Law but also committee members of incorporated associations and even 
unincorporated associations  - I’ll go into this further a bit later on. 
 
The risk of breaching the insolvent trading provisions is probably the most serious potential 
personal liability for all directors or persons who come with the extremely broad definition of 
director in s 60 of the Corporations Law.  Under the former insolvent trading provisions 
(Companies Code s 556; Corporations Law s 592 which still apply to debts incurred by a 
company before 23 June 1993) directors or persons concerned in the management of a company 
which later became insolvent could be held personally liable for debts incurred when there were 
reasonable grounds to expect that the company would not be able to pay all its debts as and when 
they became due, in other words, debts incurred when the company was commercially insolvent. 
 Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley; the National Safety Council case, Group Four 
Industries Ltd v Brosnan (1992) 10 ACLC 1431 and numerous other cases showed clearly that 
the more lenient approach to liability under s 556 which had previously been adopted by the 
majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Metal Manufacturers Pty Ltd v Lewis 
(1988) 13 NSWLR 315 would no longer be followed.  All directors must now inform themselves 
about the financial affairs of the company, especially its financial affairs. 
 
This is even more important for directors now that s 592 has been replaced by s 588G which in 
effect imposes a statutory duty on individual directors to prevent insolvent trading by a company. 
 Like s 232(4), this is a civil penalty provision. Under this section directors have a duty to prevent 
a company incurring a debt if the company is insolvent or would become insolvent if that debt 
was incurred or when there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the company was or would 
become insolvent.  The wording of s 592 was ‘reasonable grounds to expect’ that the company 
would be insolvent.  This has been replaced in s 588G by ‘reasonable grounds to suspect’ which 
clearly requires a higher standard of care (see Ford, Austin & Ramsay [20.590]-[20.664]).  
Section 588G(2) provides that this duty is breached if ‘a reasonable person in a like position in a 
company in the company’s circumstances’ would be aware of grounds for suspecting 
insolvency.’  This imposes a heavy responsibility on directors who suspect or who on the 
objective test of a model reasonable director would have reasonable grounds to suspect that a 
company is in financial difficulties to ensure that it does not trade when it is insolvent.  
Insolvency is defined in s 95A is the inability to pay all debts as and when they become due and 
payable.  As Ford, Austin and Ramsay comment ‘people who cannot read balance sheets should 
not become company directors’ (at [20.640]).  Even higher standards may be applied to directors 
with ‘special skills’, such as accountants, but this does not mean that a director who lacks 
‘ordinary’ skills will escape liability (Ibid). 
 
Once insolvent trading is an issue it isn’t really possible now to say that directors are not 
required to have a basic level of skill or competence in financial matters - same goes for 
accounts - see the following discussion.  This does not mean that it’s not safe to be on the 
board or committee if one is hopelass at figures - this is recognised in s 588H which sets out 
the defences to claims of breach of 588G. 
 
Section 588H provides several defences for directors.  It is a defence if a director can show that 
he or she had reasonable grounds to believe that the company was solvent and would remain 
solvent if the debt in question was incurred.  This belief may be based on reliance on information 
provided by a ‘competent and reliable’ person who was responsible for providing the director 
with adequate information about the company’s financial position and whom the director 
believed was complying with that responsibility.  A director who did not participate in the 
management of the company because of illness or other good reason (perhaps because only an 
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alternate director and not active then as in Playcorp or only given a limited role under the 
articles; or could not participate in a decision because had a material personal interest 
under s 232A) will also have a defence as will a director who can prove that he or she took all 
reasonable steps to prevent the company incurring the debt in question.  Once again, there are as 
yet no cases in which these provisions have been applied. 
 
Very useful detailed discussion of these defences in Ford, Austin & Ramsay - point out that 
to rely on the reasonable grounds to expect etc (588H(2)) must have reasonable grounds to 
expect and did expect that it was solvent etc which once again brings in the difference 
between expect and suspect - suspicion is enough to trigger the duty in  588G but to rely on 
the defence in 588H one needs an expectation that things are OK not just a suspicion.  The 
authors comment that it would be difficult to rely on this defence if a director just sat 
around passively and did not actively look into the company’s affairs. 
S 588H(3) - reliance on information from management is quite complicated as it requires a 
director to show that he or she thought about the competency and reliability of the 
company’s auditor or accountant or financial manager or whatever and had reasonable 
grounds to believe in this and did believe it.  Treats competency and reliability separately so 
possible could use it if aberration by a person otherwise competent and reliable and 
director relied on it  - here section does not require reasonable grounds. 
 
I. Accounts and audit 
These aspects of directors’ responsibilities were greatly increased by changes to the Corporations 
Law in 1991.  Directors must take reasonable steps to ensure that a company’s accounts give a 
true and fair view of its financial position, comply with the regulations and accounting standards, 
 are audited and that any additional information necessary to provide a true and fair view of its 
position is included (Corporations Law ss 292-3, 296-9).  Section 301 of the Corporations Law 
requires the directors to sign a statement to this effect and this must include a declaration as to the 
solvency of the company.  Section 305 requires the directors to make a report which includes 
inter alia the company's principal activities during the previous year and any significant change in 
the nature of those activities.  As Tadgell J commented in the National Safety Council case, he: 
 
`could not countenance the notion that a director should be heard legitimately to say that 
he carried on as a director and involved himself in the company's affairs in that capacity, 
for any appreciable time after an annual general meeting had received, approved and 
adopted annual accounts and an auditor's report thereon and yet did not know the 
substance of what both the accounts and the report had to say' (ACLC at 1001). 
 
The judge then extracted certain figures from the reports which he said could `be fairly easily 
appreciated by any adult person of normal intelligence who had a general knowledge of the 
company's activities and an inclination to consider the accounts and the auditors' report for half 
an hour' (ACLC at 1001) which indicated that there were obvious discrepancies in the accounts.   
In the light of these comments it would now be hard for a director who had not made a reasonable 
effort to obtain and understand a company's financial statements before signing the directors' 
report or approving the accounts to assert that he or she had complied with their duties under 
these sections of the Corporations Law or with their common law duties of care, skill and 
diligence.  The fact that accounting standards now have the status of delegated legislation under 
the Corporations Law may place directors in a very difficult position.  These provisions require 
directors to ensure that the accounts and financial statements comply with accounting standards 
and that they give a true and fair view of the company’s financial position.  If they believe that 
the accounts do not give a true and fair view they must add any additional information which is 
necessary to achieve this result.  It may be very difficult for directors to be confident that they 
have complied with these obligations. 
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In this context there seems little doubt now that there is also an element of skill or 
competence - directors are expected to be able to understand the company’s financial 
affairs - Tadgell implied this in the NSC case - quoted below and his comments were based 
on those of Ormiston J in Statewide  - directors are obliged to inform themselves about the 
company’s financial affairs to the extent necessary for them to be able to form an opinion 
so they can sign the statement required by s 305 etc and this ‘presupposes sufficient 
knowledge and understanding of the company;s affairs and records to permit the opinion 
of solvency to be formed.’ 
 
(d) Civil and Criminal liability under other legislation 
 
Directors and committee members of non-profit associations should also be aware of their 
possible personal liability for breaches of other State or federal legislation.  Environmental and 
occupational health and safety legislation now often provides that both a corporation and the 
directors or persons concerned in its management will be guilty of offences committed by the 
corporation regardless of any personal knowledge or active involvement. Section 167 of the 
Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld) is a recent example.  Similarly, s 10 of the 
Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989 (NSW) and s 66B of the Environment Protection 
Act 1970 (Vic) which deal with offences by corporations, provide that persons who are directors 
of or concerned in the management of a corporation which contravenes the Act will be held to be 
guilty of the same offence unless the director is able to satisfy the court that he or she had no 
knowledge (actual, imputed or constructive) of the breach, could not influence the conduct of the 
corporation or used all due diligence to prevent the breach (in Victoria the fact that the 
corporation would have a defence available to it is also a defence to a charge brought against a 
director).  In both Victoria and New South Wales the legislation states expressly that it is not 
necessary for proceedings to have been taken against the corporation or a conviction recorded 
against it before action is taken against a person who is a director or concerned in the 
management of a corporation.  Whether or not the director had anything to do with the offence is 
irrelevant, there is no requirement for that person to have actively breached the legislation.  He or 
she will be liable unless one of the statutory defences can be established (see Fisse, 1990; 
Cummins 1991; Christensen, 1993; Lennon, 1994). 
 
Early in 1994 a director of WA company was given a three months jail sentence for 
allowing the dumping of toxic waste even though not phsically involved himself.  There are 
also an increasing number of fines imposed on directors personally as well as on the 
company. 
 
UK case late last year probably most relevant  - managing director of an activity centre was 
given a three year jail term for manslaughter following the death of three teenagers on a 
canoeing trip organised by his company - had been told that safety procedures  was 
deficient and did nothing about it both the company and the managing director were found 
guilty - company fined 60,000 pounds. - more details if time. 
 
Another area in which there may be hidden dangers for directors and committee members is that 
of revenue law.  In many cases non-profit associations will be exempt from income tax and 
possibly also sales tax so its directors or committee members will not be concerned with the 
provisions which impose liability on the directors or officers responsible for compliance with that 
legislation.  However, it is as well to be aware of potential personal liability for breaches of 
Federal and State legislation dealing with matters such as, inter alia, Customs and Excise, Stamp 
Duty, Payroll Tax and Land Tax under all of which the persons in control of a corporation may 
be personally liable in cases where the corporation has failed to pay (see Woellner, 1991).  All 
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directors should also be aware that Corporations Law s 588FGA provides that directors may be 
liable to indemnify the Commissioner of Taxation for unremitted group tax if a company 
becomes insolvent and they cannot rely on any of the statutory defences in s 588FGB (see 
Mason, 1994). 
 
(iii) The application of the insolvent trading legislation to other associations 
 
The insolvent trading provisions in Part 5.7B of the Corporations Law apply to all directors of 
companies limited by guarantee.  It is arguable that these provisions may also apply to committee 
members of incorporated and many unincorporated associations regardless of whether they are 
incorporated by reference into the Associations Incorporation Act as is the case in South 
Australia (see s 41B).  This follows from the extremely broad definition of ‘company’ for the 
purposes of this part of the Corporations Law.  Section 588G applies to a person who is a director 
of a company.  The relevant part of the definition of company in s 9 includes a ‘Part 5.7 body’ 
which is itself defined in s 9 as ‘a partnership, association or other body (whether a body 
corporate or not) that consists of more than five members.’  This definition comes from the 
definition of an unregistered company in the early English Companies Acts and was drafted in 
these very broad terms in order to provide a means of winding up bodies such as friendly 
societies which did not have any provision for this in their rules. 
 
The natural meaning of this definition would include all incorporated and unincorporated 
associations which had more than five members and so would bring them all within the scope of 
this part of the Corporations Law which deals with winding up bodies other than companies 
(formerly called unregistered companies) as well as insolvent trading.  There is no Australian 
authority on this point but the traditional approach in England was to exclude non-profit 
associations from the equivalent English definition and so from the scope of the winding up 
provisions (see Re St James’ Club (1852) 2 De G M & G 383 at 389; Re Bristol Athenaeum 
(1890) 43 Ch D 236 at 239-40).  In two recent English cases, Re International Tin Council [1987] 
Ch 419; aff’d [1989] Ch 309 and Re Witney Town Football and Social Club [1993] BCC 874, a 
similar approach was accepted by both the judges at first instance and the Court of Appeal.  The 
International Tin Council was an unincorporated association established by treat.  A creditor had 
petitioned for it to be wound up as an unregistered company.  Both Millett J at first instance and 
the Court of Appeal held that this organisation did not come within the scope of the definition of 
‘association’ in the equivalent section of the Insolvency Act 1986 (UK).  In the Court of Appeal 
Nourse LJ quoted at length from the judgment of Lord St Leonards in Re St James’ Club in 
support of his conclusion that ‘association [did] not include an association which Parliament 
could not reasonably have intended should be subject to the winding up process’ ([1989] Ch 309 
at 330).  Similarly, in the second case, Morritt J applied this reasoning and held that an 
unincorporated professional football club could not be wound up as an unregistered company on 
the petition of its creditors.  Morritt J concluded that Parliament could not reasonably have 
intended a club of this kind to be subject to the statutory winding up procedure.  Like the Court of 
Appeal, he relied heavily on Re St James’ Club, and in particular on the fact that Lord St 
Leonards had expressly mentioned sporting clubs as an example of associations which were not 
intended to come within the scope of these provisions.  Lord St Leonards did not consider 
professional sport but Morritt J did not think that this made any difference. 
 
In Australia it remains an open question whether a court would give the definition its natural 
meaning and include incorporated and unincorporated associations or whether the English 
precedents would be followed.  In Re David Jones Mutual Aid Society (1984) 9 ACLR 130 
McLelland J applied the equivalent sections of the Companies Code to the winding up of an 
unincorporated mutual aid society.  The report of this case gives no indication that any doubts 
were raised about this point. 
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There are many differences between the regulation of the non-profit sector in England and in 
Australia.  Here the Corporations Law recognises the existence of incorporated associations as 
Registrable Australian Bodies and states expressly in s 18 that carrying on business includes 
carrying on business otherwise than for profit, so for these purposes it recognises the existence of 
non-profit organisations.  It is difficult to argue that as a matter of principle incorporated 
associations and possibly also some unincorporated associations would not also come within the 
scope of this part of the Corporations Law. 
 
It is interesting that the author of the relevant part of Butterworths Corporations Law 
Service Principles and Practice makes similar comments  - noting that the application of the 
UK decisions is questionable because s 18 includes carrying on business other than for 
profit in the definition. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The cumulative effect of all these changes leaves no doubt at all that in future the directors and 
members of the committees or governing bodies of all kinds of organisations will be required to 
comply with more stringent standards.  The change in judicial approach which was first evident 
in cases like Morley and the National Safety Council case and has continued to gain momentum 
should be a warning signal for all those asked to serve on the boards or committee of non-profit 
associations.  It has taken a long time, but, the weight of opinion does appear finally to have 
accepted a more stringent approach to the enforcement of directors' duties as predicted many 
years ago by Sir Douglas Menzies (Menzies, 1959, p.156).  Speaking at an Australian Legal 
Convention, Sir Douglas Menzies said then: 
 
`The content of the standard of care that the law requires from a director received its definition 
at a time when the whole duty of many a director was to attend board meetings when 
convenient, to join in decisions on matters of policy based upon the recommendation of the 
company's officers and to sign his name on share certificates, transfers and cheques so often 
as to make his hand tired.  If trouble brewed, the easiest and the safest course was to stay 
away from board meetings...[This] narrow conception of the duties of a director...is of 
course no longer the case so far as most companies and most directors are concerned and 
there can be no doubt that, as time goes on, it will become progressively less the case...As 
more is expected of directors, so more will be required of them.' 
 
There is now no doubt that all directors will be expected to take reasonable steps to place 
themselves in a position to guide and monitor the management of the company.  Exactly what is 
required in each case remains uncertain, especially since AWA.  The standards of care and 
diligence and the extent to which non-executive directors may rely on others is a particularly 
difficult issue for all directors, as is the degree of skill which may be required. 
 
The Corporations Law makes no mention of skill in s 232(4), however, the common law duty 
does include an element of skill (see Re City Equitable).  In his judgment in the National Safety 
Council case Tadgell J appeared to imply that a director would be required to possess a minimum 
standard of competence or skill which would enable him or her to understand the company's 
accounts and financial statements. (see 9 ACLC at p.1001).  Compare the comments of Young J 
in Dwyer v NCSC (1989) 15 ACLR 386 at 390, in the context of disqualification of directors, that 
`the law does not yet require competence from directors as a matter of law.' 
 
At first instance in AWA Rogers CJ accepted that the law now insisted that ‘directors accept more 
and more responsibility for oversight of a company’s affairs at the same time as the affairs of 
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companies become more and more complex and diverse’ ((1992) 10 ACLC at 1013).  He noted 
that in some circumstances this might mean that directors be required to seek and rely on expert 
or professional advice.  However, he also accepted the need for directors to be able to rely on 
management to attend to all the details involved in managing the corporation and to draw to their 
attention matters needing the board’s consideration.  He contrasted the position of a chief 
executive who is required to exercise the care and skill to be expected of a person in that position 
with the position of the non-executive directors.  The former must comply with an objective 
standard of skill, but he accepted ‘that there is no objective standard of the reasonably competent 
company director to which the [non-executive directors] may aspire’ (ibid at 1014-5). 
 
In contrast, the Report of the Royal Commission into Tricontinental did not accept that it was 
enough for non-executive directors to make decisions on matters of policy.  They must also 
ensure that they are adequately informed about ‘matters affecting the financial performance and 
health of their corporations’ (at 19.53; see also Ford, Austin & Ramsay p 8162).  It appears that 
the Royal Commission’s views are more closely attuned to those of the New South Wales Court 
of Appeal which are discussed above than to those of Rogers CJ. 
 
If directors are now required to have a certain level of competence in financial or business 
matters, what will be the position of directors who are asked to join a board because of some 
special experience or expertise even though they may have little or no business training or 
background?  In Southern Resources Ltd v Residues Treatment and Trading Co Ltd (1990) 3 
ACSR 207 at 224-5 the Full Supreme Court of South Australia held that a mining expert who had 
been appointed to the board in that capacity and had only been on the board for a short time could 
not have been expected to under stand the `intricacies of the corporate structure and its 
interlocking interests.'  Directors contributed different skills and when exercising an independent 
judgment were required to listen to and `having listened to and assessed what their colleagues 
have to say, they must bring their own mind to bear on the issue using such skill and judgment as 
they may possess.'  After referring to this case, a recent commentator noted that `if a director is so 
much a specialist as to render him unable to make intelligent decisions on other aspects of the 
company's business he should not be a director' (Macfarlan, 1992 p.12).   
 
Several recent decisions in Western Australia have taken a pragmatic approach to the position of 
non-executive directors and in doing so have relied heavily on the judgment of Rogers CJ in 
AWA (see ASC v Gallagher (1993) 11 ACLC ; Hurley v ASC (1993) 11 ACLC 443; Vrisakis v 
ASC (1993) 11 ACLC 763, all of which dealt with prosecutions of non-executive directors for 
breaches of s 232(4) or its predecessor.  See also Biala Pty Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (1993) 11 
ACLC 1082; Permanent Building Society (in liq) v Wheeler (1994) 12 ACLC 674 both of which 
discussed the degree to which non-executive directors could reasonably rely on information 
provided by executives and officers of the company.).  The extent to which the decision of the 
Court of Appeal in AWA requires the approach taken in these decisions to be reassessed is not 
clear. 
 
These issues are difficult enough in the context of non-executive directors of commercial 
companies, many of whom have considerable business and financial experience.  They are much 
more difficult in the context of voluntary directors and committee members of non-profit 
organisations.  There are obvious difficulties in working out a standard which is appropriate in 
particular situations, as Greenwood noted `[t]he quality of fiduciary service ought not to be 
determined by the amount (if any) of payment provided; the director who voluntarily assumes 
that role ought not, merely because he or she is a volunteer, be permitted to define the limits of 
the role so assumed...this may be particularly relevant to the role of directors of not-for-profit 
corporations, who frequently act without remuneration, and may perhaps have inadequate 
understanding of the responsibilities and liabilities of their office' (1992 p.62). 
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What are directors to do?  There is no `business judgment' rule in Australia which would protect 
directors who have made a properly informed decision in good faith in the best interests of the 
company and who have no conflict of interest.  The introduction of a business judgment rule was 
recommended in the Cooney Report and by the Company and Securities Law Review Committee 
but was not adopted in the Corporate Law Reform Act 1992.  Since the decision of the Court of 
Appeal in AWA there have been further calls for its introduction.  Until recently Australian courts 
were very reluctant to interfere in management decisions as long as directors have acted 
reasonably and honestly and for a proper purpose in what they felt were the best interests of the 
company.  This approach is often regarded as giving tacit recognition to a business judgment 
principle. However, there must be some doubt as to whether this approach can now continue. 
 
There will be no problems in the occasional extreme case where a director has been completely 
passive and taken no part at all in the activities of a company, this can’t bo be justified in any 
situation at all - but what standard should be used to determine `the degree of care and diligence 
that a reasonable person in a like position in a corporation would exercise in the corporation’s 
circumstances’ (s 232(4)) in , for example, the kind of situation which arose in the United States 
in Smith v Van Gorkom or in Australia in AWA. 
 
In AWA the Court of Appeal commented that directors could seek relief under s 1318 of the 
Corporations Law (formerly Companies Code s 535), noting that the purpose of that section is to 
‘excuse company officers from liability [for negligence] in situations where it would be unjust 
and oppressive not to do so, recognising that such officers are businessmen and women who act 
in an environment involving risk in commercial decision making (13 ACLC at 680).  The courts 
have a wide discretion to give relief under this section and in the context of unpaid directors of a 
non-profit associations incorporated as a company limited by guarantee, may be prepared to do so 
if a director had acted honestly and in their view ought fairly to be excused.  Tadgell J referred to 
this jurisdiction in the passage quoted earlier from his judgment in the National Safety Council 
case (see p 3).  In future this section may well be more widely applied to relieve directors from 
liability, especially the voluntary, unpaid directors of non-profit associations which are 
incorporated as companies limited by guarantee.  Unfortunately this section is only relevant for 
persons who are directors of non-profit associations which are incorporated as companies limited 
by guarantee.  There are no similar provisions in any of the Associations Incorporation Acts. 
 
Section 1317JA similarly gives the court a discretion to relieve directors from liability 
under a civil penalty order and from paying compensation if they acted honestly and in all 
the circumstances ought fairly to be excused.   S 1317JA(4) allows a person to apply for 
relief in advance if they fear proceedings for contravention of s 588G.  As yet there are no 
reporated cases in which this section has been relied on. 
 
It is still unclear whether these changes in the judicial approach to directors’ duties of care, skill 
and diligence will flow on to the enforcement of the common law and equitable duties which 
apply to the committee members of both unincorporated and incorporated associations.  
However, my personal opinion is that all persons in a similar fiduciary position will now be 
required to conform to higher standards of care and diligence and possibly also skill.  All 
directors and committee members must now accept that they are subject to enforceable duties of 
care, skill and diligence and it will no longer be enough for them to assume that they can leave 
the management of the association's affairs to one or two of their number or the association's 
employees.  On the other hand it is difficult to believe that directors and committee members who 
take an active interest in the affairs of a non-profit association, keep themselves properly 
informed about its financial position, attend meetings, ask searching and persistent questions 
when they have any doubts and ensure that they get satisfactory answers to their questions would 
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be found to have breached any of their common law or statutory duties of care, diligence or skill 
at least in the absence of any question of insolvent trading.  It does seem possible that s 588G 
might require directors to comply with more stringent standards involving a greater element of 
skill but this will depend on how the Courts interpret this section. 
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